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The ‘rule of thumb’ that left-wing parties cause inflation is
probably bogus – and has democratic implications
Do left-wing parties really cause inflation? And do right-wing parties really cause low inflation, but high
unemployment? These well-worn tropes are influential in elections, but do they hold up? Research
by Christopher Gandrud and Cassandra Grafström suggests that the former does not, even if political debate
continues to factor it in. 
Inflation mgnet? (Credit: underclassrising.net, CC BY SA 2.0)
A common rule of thumb among economists is that left-wing governments pursue polices that lower
unemployment, but cause inflation. Right-wing governments are expected to implement lower inflation policies
even at the cost of lowered employment. How well do these expectations relate to reality? Do these common
expectations spill over into real world policies? Recent experiences suggest that there actually isn’t much
difference in economic policies under left and right-wing governments. So, what are the consequences of
monetary policy-makers sticking to these rules of thumb if they are inaccurate? In a recent paper (gated and
ungated) we investigated these questions by looking at the United States Federal Reserves’ inflation forecasts.
Monetary policy-making is inherently forward-looking. Interest rates are set with expectations of future inflation in
mind. In pursuit of price stability, modern central banks aim for moderate inflation. In the UK the legal goal is two
percent. Crudely, if central bankers think that inflation will be too high, then they raise interest rates to tamp it
down. This tends to also slow economic growth and employment. Central bankers can respond to inflation that is
too low by lowering interest rates. This tends to also increase economic growth and employment. Expectations
about inflation have an important impact on the everyday economic lives of us all.
When inflation is overestimated, monetary policies could be chosen that inappropriately slow growth. On the other
hand, when it is underestimated, policies might be implemented that fuel economic growth and possibly bubbles
in the future.
To see how accurate inflation expectations are, we looked at about forty years of forecasts made by the United
States Federal Reserve. We found that, regardless of what economic policies were pursed, the Fed tended to
overestimate inflation when the president was a Democrat and underestimate inflation for Republicans.
The first figure below shows our predictions about the forecasting errors that that the Fed makes when the
president is a Democrat (blue bars) compared to when they are a Republican (red bars). We controlled for a
variety of economic and policy conditions, including government expenditure, interest rate changes,
unemployment, and recessions. Because the lines move closer to zero—a perfect forecast—as the forecasted
period nears, we can see that the later a forecast is made the more accurate it is. Nonetheless, even when
making forecasts for the present quarter there are still distinct partisan differences. We found that inflation in the
present quarter tends to be underestimated by about 10 percent when the president is a Republican and
overestimated by about 15 percent when they are a Democrat.
Figure 1: Simulated expected inflation forecast error for Republican and Democratic presidencies
Not only do Fed forecasters anticipate that Democratic presidents will have a bigger impact on inflation than they
actually do, but forecasters also expect government spending to increase inflation more than it does. In the next
plot we show key coefficient estimates from our models. The important take away is that estimates above 0 are
associated with inflation overestimates. Those below zero are associated with underestimates. Again we see
inflation is overestimated during Democratic presidencies. Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP is
also strongly associated with overestimates.
Figure 2: 95 percent confidence bands for association with Fed inflation forecasting errors
Overestimates for Democratic presidents and government spending are related. In the partisan-inflation rule of
thumb, left-wing parties, pursuing lower unemployment, cause higher inflation by trying to boost the economy with
government spending. More government spending increases the supply of money in the economy and so the
value of money goes down—inflation. However, our findings show that Fed forecasters overestimate the effect of
these policies on price stability for governments on both sides of the aisle.
Incorrect rules of thumb could lead central bankers to raise or lower interest rates at inappropriate times. For left-
wing governments they may keep interest rates too high, constricting growth. And for right-wing governments they
could keep interest rates too low, fueling economic growth in the short to medium-term, but possibly causing
bubbles in the future. Neither of these outcomes is desirable from an economic standpoint.
What’s more, we know that economic well-being is strongly related with voters’ choices. If the economy is doing
well, incumbents are more likely to be re-elected. When it is doing poorly they are more likely to be kicked out.
Using incorrect rules of thumb to predict inflation could lead to monetary policies that unfairly handicap left-wing
parties in elections and provide for a boost to right-wing incumbents.
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